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FICA TAXATION OF POST-EMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS: A STATUTORY PUZZLE AND 
SOCIOPOLITICAL CONUNDRUM 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOPOLITICAL CONUNDRUM 
―Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.‖1 One might wonder, then, 
what can be expected of cases that are both great and hard? This Note 
discusses such an issue—the imposition of FICA tax on severance 
payments—and the result has been cases that present highly technical, 
reasoned analyses with conflicting conclusions. While it may seem 
doubtful that this issue deserves such an admittedly dramatic description,
2
 
upon closer inspection, it appears warranted: this issue involves 
sympathetic stakeholders on both sides, the political minefield of the 
payroll tax, the complexity of the tax code, conflicting legal authority, and 
a sensitive, post-recession economic backdrop, and now, an imminent 
Supreme Court case. 
The 2012 election cycle and the political negotiations arising from the 
attempt to avoid the ―fiscal cliff‖ shortly thereafter3 reignited debate on the 
role of social insurance programs and notions of shared responsibility. The 
expiration of a payroll tax cut, effective January 1, 2013,
4
 also reminded 
working Americans of their own role in funding Social Security and 
Medicare, and, to some, signaled a political calculation that the Social 
Security and Medicare programs need that extra percentage of taxpayers‘ 
 
 
 1. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice 
Holmes clarified that ―great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the 
law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to 
the feelings and distorts the judgment.‖ Id. at 400–01. 
 2. See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 398 (2d ed. 1995) 
(warning that the ―hard cases make bad law‖ ―cliché is probably used as frequently today as it ever 
was—and sometimes unmeaningfully.‖). 
 3. Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, coined the phrase ―fiscal cliff‖ to refer to 
the consequences our economy could face if Congress was unable to agree on a deficit-reduction bill. 
For a straightforward explanation of the fiscal cliff and related issues, see Jackie Calmes, Demystifying 
the Fiscal Impasse That Is Vexing Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A20, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/us/politics/the-fiscal-cliff-explained.html. See also Editorial, A 
Tepid Fiscal Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2013, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/01/01/opinion/a-tepid-agreement-on-the-fiscal-cliff.html. 
 4. See IRS PROVIDES UPDATED WITHHOLDING GUIDANCE, IR-2013-1 (Jan. 3, 2013), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Provides-Updated-Withholding-Guidance-for-2013 (Last 
updated Jan. 24, 2013) (―[E]mployers should also begin withholding Social Security tax at the rate of 
6.2 percent of wages paid following the expiration of the temporary two-percentage-point payroll tax 
cut in effect for 2011 and 2012.‖). 
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income more than the taxpayers do.
5
 At the heart of all of this discussion is 
the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), the chapter in the tax 
code that created a payroll tax on employees and employers to contribute 
to the funding of Social Security and Medicare programs.
6
  
The taxation of severance payments, in particular, adds a layer of 
complexity to the sociopolitical issues that are already presented by FICA, 
Social Security, and Medicare. On the one hand, furthering the lofty goals 
of Social Security and Medicare and continuing to provide much-needed 
support to elderly Americans might suggest the need to reach as broad of a 
tax base as possible. On the other hand, severance payments are an 
especially delicate source of income. As our country emerges from a 
recession, many Americans are unemployed; those fortunate enough to 
receive some form of severance payment from their former employers may 
be without another source of income for an extended period of time, 
thereby making a tax on that severance payment particularly burdensome.
7
 
It becomes clear that there are many conflicting interests at stake and that 
no matter how the calculation is resolved, one side faces a discernible loss 
of revenue or income at a time when neither can afford it.
8
 
 
 
 5. See infra note 67; PAYROLL TAX CUT TO BOOST TAKE-HOME PAY FOR MOST WORKERS; 
NEW WITHHOLDING DETAILS NOW AVAILABLE ON IRS.GOV, IR-2010-124 (Dec. 17, 2010), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Payroll-Tax-Cut-to-Boost-Take-Home-Pay-for-Most-Workers;-New-With 
holding-Details-Now-Available-on-IRS.gov (Last updated Aug. 3, 2012); PAYROLL TAX CUT 
EXTENDED TO THE END OF 2012; REVISED PAYROLL TAX FORM NOW AVAILABLE TO EMPLOYERS, IR-
2012-27 (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Payroll-Tax-Cut-Extended-to-the-End-
of-2012;-Revised-Payroll-Tax-Form-Now-Available-to-Employers (Last Updated Aug. 4, 2012). For a 
not-so-gentle reminder that the expiration of the payroll tax holiday is not really a tax increase, see 
Tony Nitti, Dear America: Your Higher Payroll Taxes Are Not The Result Of A Tax Increase, FORBES 
(Jan. 14, 2013, 10:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2013/01/14/dear-america-your-
higher-payroll-taxes-are-not-the-result-of-a-tax-increase. See also Zachary A. Goldfarb, Amid 
Standoff, End of a Long Era of Falling Taxes, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2013, at A01. 
 6. See I.R.C. § 3128 (2006). 
 7. In April 2013, 37.4% of unemployed persons had been unemployed for twenty-seven weeks 
or longer. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF LABOR, ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE, TABLE 
A-12, UNEMPLOYED PERSONS BY DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT, available at http://www.bls.gov/ 
news.release/empsit.t12.htm (Last modified Oct. 22, 2013). Many view payroll taxes as regressive, 
placing a greater burden on lower-income workers than those earning a higher income, adding another 
layer to the already-delicate discussion. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Lucky Ducky Redux, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 8, 2010, 5:09 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/lucky-ducky-redux. But see 
Kip Hagopian & Lee E. Ohanian, Payroll Taxes Are „Regressive‟? Time to Rethink That Idea, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 30, 2012, at A23, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044368410 
4578063140488175464.html (suggesting that these payroll taxes are not actually regressive, despite 
common claims to the contrary). 
 8. This Note intends to take no position on the normative desirability of these programs, but 
rather, assumes for the sake of argument that, at the very least, maintaining Social Security and 
Medicare in some form is an important political objective. The term ―side‖ is used loosely here and is 
not intended to evoke feelings of conflict between the Government and the people. Rather, the conflict 
is one between interests; on one ―side‖ is the interest of the Government in generating revenue to fund 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/5
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This particular issue, whether severance payments are ―wages‖ subject 
to FICA taxation, has been characterized as a ―straightforward, but legally-
confounding question,‖9 but, as will be discussed, it is generous to refer to 
this issue as ―straightforward‖ at all. In September 2012, the Sixth Circuit 
decided In re Quality Stores,
10
 holding that the payments were not taxable. 
Because the Federal Circuit had previously held that the payments are 
taxable as wages,
11
 most recently in the 2008 case CSX Corporation v. 
United States,
12
 the Sixth Circuit opinion created a circuit split. With such 
complex political, social, and economic interests implicated in the 
determination that severance payments are (or are not) subject to FICA 
tax, a disagreement among the circuit courts of appeal creates a renewed 
urgency for due consideration of the Social Security and Medicare 
programs and the FICA tax that funds them. 
In Part II, this Note examines the historical context of Social Security 
and Medicare, subsequently providing a descriptive overview of FICA and 
the severance payments at issue. Part III discusses the factual background 
of In re Quality Stores
13
 and CSX Corporation v. United States,
14
 the cases 
 
 
Social Security and Medicare, and on the other ―side‖ is the interest of the individual in limiting tax 
liability upon termination from employment. Surely the people have a strong interest in Social Security 
and Medicare, based on their status as entitlement programs, and surely the Government has an interest 
in lessening the burden of unemployment on its citizens. In short, while framed as a conflict between 
―sides,‖ this issue has an enormously broad reach that affects all Americans. 
 9. In re Quality Stores, Inc., 424 B.R. 237, 239 (W.D. Mich. 2010), aff'd, 693 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 
2012). The Court, in further framing the issue before it, noted the complexity of the analysis: 
 The few courts that have addressed this issue, or variations of it, have reached directly 
opposing outcomes. Where one court has found severance payments to be subject to taxation, 
the next has reached the opposite conclusion. The fact that the Internal Revenue Service has 
itself charted a path of ―reverse-course‖ rulings on this issue since the 1950s only adds to the 
difficulties faced by the courts in attempting to reach a reasoned resolution by explaining and 
accounting for this repeated change in agency position. 
 To say that these differing rulings are simply the product of results-oriented decision-
making is tempting, but unsupportable. The courts have not only diligently wrestled with the 
justification for their conclusions, but also endeavored to fashion some appropriate, logical 
framework for the analysis of this issue. 
Id. at 240. For a brief overview of the issue and a discussion of the practical stakes, see generally 
Laura Saunders, When Severance Pay Is Subject to Payroll Tax, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2012, at B9, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203937004578079192865327704.html. 
 10. 693 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012), reh‟g en banc denied, 2013 WL 673917, 111 A.F.T.R. 2d 
2013-494 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 11. See generally Jeremy L. Hirsh, Note, The Wages of Not Working: FICA Liability for 
Severance Payments in Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 54 TAX LAW. 811 
(2001) (discussing Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), a 
predecessor to CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed Cir. 2008)). 
 12. CSX Corp., 518 F.3d 1328.  
 13. 693 F.3d 605. 
 14. 518 F.3d 1328. 
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that created a circuit split on the issue of withholding FICA tax from 
severance payments. Part IV will introduce each component of the 
relevant authority on this issue and will undertake a detailed analysis of 
the courts‘ treatment of the authority. Finally, in Part V, this Note will 
weigh the competing interests and various options and propose both a 
short-term solution for courts and a long-term solution for Congress. 
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND: THE MAKINGS OF A ―GREAT CASE‖15 
A. Social Security and Medicare: History, Status, and Sustainability 
With all discussions of normative desirability and feasibility aside, 
Social Security and Medicare play an important role in the lives of the 
programs‘ beneficiaries and in our society.16 To understand the political, 
economic, and social importance of Social Security and Medicare, one 
must understand their background. These programs were enacted only 
after great difficulty and remain a proud accomplishment of our political 
system, despite any discord surrounding their present operation. The 
political discourse from the beginnings of both of these programs is 
strikingly similar; there is a recurring sense of urgency and social 
necessity followed by a deep appreciation of the difficulty of their design 
and enactment.
17
  
1. A Brief History of Social Security 
The Social Security Act,
18
 enacted in 1935, was designed to protect 
against the ―hazards and vicissitudes of life.‖19 As the first comprehensive 
social welfare policy, ―[t]he Social Security Act provided a policy 
 
 
 15. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see supra 
text accompanying note 1. 
 16. There is little room to dispute that, if nothing else, Social Security and Medicare play an 
important role in our society because of their size. In 2011, the combined cost of Social Security and 
Medicare was about 8.5% of GDP. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2012 ANNUAL SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TRUST 
FUND REPORTS 2, available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/tr12summary.pdf [hereinafter 
TRUSTEES‘ REPORTS]. Unarguably, these programs can be a matter of life and death for their 
beneficiaries.  
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 21–23. 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2006).  
 19. ANDREW DOBELSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT: THE FOUNDATION OF 
SOCIAL WELFARE FOR AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3 (2009) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 
73-397 (1934)). See generally Social Security History, SSA.GOV, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013) (providing a historical overview of the Social Security Act). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/5
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framework for administering retirement and unemployment insurance as 
well as providing welfare payments to aged adults, the disabled blind, and 
children.‖20 Upon signing, President Roosevelt recognized the attempt ―to 
frame a law which will give some measure of protection to the average 
citizen and to his family against the loss of a job and against poverty-
ridden old age.‖21 
Despite constitutional challenges, the Social Security Act has been 
upheld as within Congress‘s power to levy a tax for the promotion of the 
general welfare.
22
 In validating the constitutionality of the tax imposed on 
wages to fund Social Security, the Supreme Court echoed the theme of 
necessity, noting, ―the number of the unemployed mounted to 
unprecedented heights‖ and declaring, ―[i]t is too late today for the 
argument to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use of 
the moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and their dependents is 
a use for any purpose narrower than the promotion of the general 
welfare.‖23  
The implementation program for Social Security is, in essence, a 
―contractual relationship between those who worked and were taxed to 
ensure economic benefits for themselves and their dependents.‖24 Many 
studies have attempted to address ―whether an individual or group of 
persons can expect to get a ‗fair‘ return in the form of benefits for the tax 
 
 
 20. DOBELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 3. 
 21. Presidential Statement on Signing the Social Security Act (Aug. 14, 1935), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/fdrstmts.html#signing. President Roosevelt further explained: 
 This law, too, represents a cornerstone in a structure which is being built but is by no 
means complete. It is a structure intended to lessen the force of possible future depressions. It 
will act as a protection to future Administrations against the necessity of going deeply into 
debt to furnish relief to the needy. The law will flatten out the peaks and valleys of deflation 
and of inflation. It is, in short, a law that will take care of human needs and at the same time 
provide the United States an economic structure of vastly greater soundness. 
 22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 23. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586–87 (1937). The Court vividly 
described the circumstances of the passage of the Social Security Act: 
During the years 1929 to 1936, when the country was passing through a cyclical depression, 
the number of the unemployed mounted to unprecedented heights. Often the average was 
more than 10 million; at times a peak was attained of 16 million or more. Disaster to the 
breadwinner meant disaster to dependents. Accordingly the roll of the unemployed, itself 
formidable enough, was only a partial roll of the destitute or needy. The fact developed 
quickly that the states were unable to give the requisite relief. The problem had become 
national in area and dimensions. There was need of help from the nation if the people were 
not to starve. 
Id. at 586. Later, in United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712 (1947), the Court reinforced the notion 
that the Social Security Act is ―an attack on recognized evils in our national economy.‖ 
 24. DOBELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 27.  
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contributions made.‖25 Recognizing that the program is designed ―to 
provide a minimally adequate ‗floor of protection‘‖ for low-earning 
workers in addition to ―a reasonably equitable return for even the highest-
paid workers,‖ it is noted that the structure creates ―divergent rates of 
return for different groups of workers.‖26 Notably, however, the ―monetary 
and social value of the program to higher-paid workers transcends the 
amount of benefits that they may personally expect to receive.‖27 Under 
this view, even if the financial returns are lower than a private investment 
or annuity, there is a discernible benefit to all workers.
28
 
Although it ―resembles its original form,‖ the Social Security Act has 
―expanded beyond anything envisioned by its 1935 developers.‖29 As of 
June 30, 2013, there were approximately 57,469,000 beneficiaries, and 
eighty-eight percent of the population over the age of sixty-five received 
Social Security benefits.
30
 Still, Social Security is ―a cornerstone in a 
structure [that is] by no means complete‖ on its own.31 Medicare adds to 
that structure. 
2. A Brief History of Medicare 
Medicare was signed into law on July 30, 1965.
32
 In his remarks on the 
date the bill was signed, President Johnson paid homage to the 
 
 
 25. Yung-Ping Chen & Stephen C. Goss, Are Returns on Payroll Taxes Fair?, in SOCIAL 
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 76, 76 (Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz eds., 1997). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. Chen & Goss note: 
Absent Social Security, many lower-paid workers could not save enough to provide a 
minimally adequate retirement income and would thus require some form of public assistance 
in their old age. The mandatory withholding of Social Security payroll taxes from the lower-
paid workers assures that they will make some reasonable contribution toward the cost of 
their retirement income. The resulting cost to the higher-paid of subsidizing the retirement 
income needs of the lower-paid is thus almost certainly less when financed through the Social 
Security program than if, for example, it were financed with income taxes through public 
assistance. 
Id. at 76–77. 
 28. Id. This basic assumption that there is some benefit to all workers is intended to be non-
controversial and underlies the discussion in this Note. 
 29. DOBELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 3.  
 30. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., FACT SHEET ON THE OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS, AND DISABILITY 
INSURANCE PROGRAM (July 24, 2013), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/FACTS/fs2013_ 
06.pdf.  
 31. Presidential Statement on Signing the Medicare Bill (July 30, 1965), available at 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650730.asp (quoting from President 
Roosevelt‘s Statement on Signing the Social Security Act).  
 32. Medicare was enacted in the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89–97, 
79 Stat. 286. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/5
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foundational work in the passage of the Social Security Act, echoing its 
rhetoric and crediting the efforts of President Truman twenty years earlier. 
―[T]he need for this action is plain‖, he said, ―and it is so clear indeed that 
we marvel not simply at the passage of this bill, but . . . that it took so 
many years to pass it.‖33 
Medicare is a complex program, the intricacies of which are beyond the 
scope of this Note.
34
 At its core, however, Medicare provides certain 
health insurance to individuals over age sixty-five, and to certain disabled 
individuals under age sixty-five.
35
 Medicare ―Part A‖ provides hospital 
insurance,
36
 and ―Part B‖ provides supplementary medical insurance 
benefits.
37
 Medicare ―Part C,‖ also known as ―Medicare+Choice‖ provides 
an alternative to Parts A and B and allows beneficiaries to receive their 
insurance benefits from certain private providers.
38
 Medicare ―Part D‖ 
provides prescription drug coverage.
39
  
Medicare‘s primary purpose is fundamentally different from that of 
Social Security—it endeavors to provide federal health insurance to the 
elderly, rather than provide retirement income.
40
 Medicare is funded in 
part by payroll taxes, just like Social Security, but because of its different 
purpose, the logic of a Medicare payroll tax is different from the basis of 
Social Security.
41
 While a Social Security payroll tax is premised in part 
on a contractual relationship between those who work and the Social 
Security Administration, thus creating an earnings-related benefit, a 
Medicare payroll tax takes the form of social insurance.
42
  
 
 
 33. Presidential Statement on Signing the Medicare Bill, supra note 31. 
 34. Unfortunately, those seeking its benefits cannot brush aside Medicare‘s complexities so 
quickly. See JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 52 (2003) (discussing 
relevant studies and noting that ―[q]uite simply, many of the elderly do not understand the limitations 
of Medicare coverage‖). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 426 (2006). 
 36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006). 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2006). 
 38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 39. See § 1395w-101 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 40. OBERLANDER, supra note 34 at 17. This system is unique in that ―no other industrial 
democracy . . . has compulsory health insurance for its elderly citizens alone, and none has started its 
program with such a beneficiary group.‖ Id. (quoting Theodore Marmor, Coping with a Creeping 
Crisis: Medicare at Twenty, in SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 178 (Theodore 
R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw eds., 1988). 
 41. Id. at 76. 
 42. See DOBELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 27. See also OBERLANDER, supra note 34, at 76. 
Although Social Security is in part a contract between workers and the Social Security Administration, 
it does have a social insurance aspect, similar to Medicare. The programs have many similarities, but 
their differences are important in shaping policy discussions. See supra notes 20–21 and 
accompanying text. 
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3. The Status and Sustainability of Social Security and Medicare 
Despite a steady increase in the payroll tax rate over time,
43
 projections 
show that Social Security and Medicare ―are not sustainable under 
currently scheduled financing and will require legislative action to avoid 
disruptive consequences.‖44 Naturally, the 2012 election cycle brought 
these programs—and their projected longevity—to the front of public 
discourse once again. The Democratic and Republican party platforms 
addressed Medicare and Social Security,
45
 as did the candidates in the 
presidential debates.
46
 Discussions surrounding the ―fiscal cliff‖ further 
revived the ongoing debate again in December 2012.
47
 Despite the sense 
of urgency and what seemed to be an ideal forum for substantively 
addressing the role of Social Security and Medicare in our country, much 
was left to be dealt with later.
48
 
 
 
 43. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of FICA, the payroll tax at issue. 
 44. TRUSTEES‘ REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. 
 45. The Democratic Platform characterized the Republican budget proposal as one that would 
―end Medicare as we know it,‖ contending further that ―Medicare is a sacred compact with our 
seniors‖ that must be preserved. The Platform concluded: ―Democrats believe that Social Security and 
Medicare must be kept strong for seniors, people with disabilities, and future generations. Our 
opponents have shown a shocking willingness to gut these programs to pay for tax cuts for the 
wealthiest, and we fundamentally reject that approach.‖ DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, 
MOVING AMERICA FORWARD: 2012 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM, available at http://assets 
.dstatic.org/dnc-platform/2012-National-Platform.pdf. 
 By contrast, the Republican Platform focused on the cost of these programs, arguing that it was 
―already harming job creation and growth‖ and that ―projections of future spending growth are nothing 
short of catastrophic, both economically and socially.‖ REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION, 
BELIEVE IN AMERICA: 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 23, available at http://www.gop.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf. However, the Platform contended that the Republican 
Party was ―committed to saving Medicare . . . by modernizing it, by empowering its participants, and 
by putting it on secure financial footing.‖ Id. at 21. But see Gary King & Samir S. Soneji, Social 
Security: It‟s Worse Than You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at SR4, available at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/opinion/sunday/social-security-its-worse-than-you-think.html (arguing that 
while President Obama and Governor Romney agreed that Social Security should not be changed, 
―both were utterly wrong‖). 
 46. Jeff Zeleny & Jim Rutenberg, Obama and Romney, in First Debate, Spar Over Fixing the 
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/us/ 
politics/obama-and-romney-hold-first-debate.html. In the first presidential debate, President Obama 
suggested that health care costs must be lowered to sustain Medicare, but that structural changes to 
Social Security are not necessary. See Transcript of the First Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/03/us/politics/transcript-of-the-first-presidential-debate-in-
denver.html. Governor Romney noted his agreement that Social Security should not be changed for 
people aged 60 or older. See id. His position on Medicare was that President Obama had planned to cut 
the program and that he, as president, would continue Medicare but also offer private vouchers as an 
option to seniors. See id. 
 47. See supra note 3. 
 48. The Trustees‘ Report urges: ―If lawmakers act sooner rather than later, they can consider 
more options and more time will be available to phase in the changes, giving the public adequate time 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/5
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These concerns, however, do not necessarily signal imminent demise 
for Social Security or Medicare. In fact, some commentators argue that we 
should generally ―have confidence in the long-run viability of‖ the Social 
Security trust fund (OASDI)
49
 because, in part, of its great flexibility.
50
 
This flexibility is, ―namely, that both benefit and financing provisions can 
be altered to meet changing social, economic, and demographic 
conditions.‖51 Important aspects of this flexibility are, of course, the 
structure and sources of funding. 
B. The FICA Payroll Tax 
FICA, the Federal Insurance Contributions Act,
52
 funds Social Security 
and Medicare by imposing a tax on ―every individual‖ equal to a certain 
percentage of ―wages . . . received by him with respect to employment.‖53 
―Employment‖ is defined broadly to include ―any service, of whatever 
nature, performed . . . by an employee for the person employing him.‖54 
The term ―wages‖ means, with certain enumerated exclusions, ―all 
remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all 
remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash.‖55 
The tax is collected by the employer, who ―deduct[s] the amount of the 
tax from the wages as and when paid.‖56 The employer also pays its own 
share—an ―excise tax‖ equal to a percentage of the wages paid to its 
employees.
57
 The percentage deducted from employees‘ wages is equal to 
the percentage that employers pay; in effect, each party pays half of the 
total tax collected on each employee‘s wages.58  
 
 
to prepare.‖ TRUSTEE‘S REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. However, if the ―fiscal cliff‖ negotiations are any 
indication, such action is unlikely to take materialize. See Janet Hook, Corey Boles & Siobhan 
Hughes, Congress Passes Cliff Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 
424127887323320404578215373352793876.html (referring to the passage as breaking a ―rancorous 
stalemate,‖ but leaving ―a host of issues unresolved and guarantee[ing] continued budget clashes 
between the parties‖). 
 49. See TRUSTEES‘ REPORTS, supra note 16, at 1; see also infra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
 50. Robert J. Myers, Will Social Security Be There for Me?, in SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY, supra note 25, at 208, 214–15.  
 51. Id. at 215. 
 52. I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 53. I.R.C. § 3101(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 54. I.R.C. § 3121(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 55. I.R.C. § 3121(a) (parentheses in original). 
 56. I.R.C. § 3102 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 57. I.R.C. § 3111(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 58. See I.R.C. § 3111(a)-(b) (currently requiring the employer to pay 6.2% of its employees‘ 
wages to Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, plus 1.45% to Hospital Insurance) and I.R.C. 
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FICA-generated revenue is credited to four separate trust funds 
managed by the Department of the Treasury.
59
 The Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund pays retirement and survivors benefits, 
while the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund pays disability benefits.
60
 
These two trust funds together are known as OASDI, which collectively 
pay Social Security benefits.
61
 The Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund 
pays for inpatient hospital care, while the Supplementary Medical 
Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund covers Medicare Part B and Medicare Part 
D.
62
 The Social Security Administration notes that in 2011, ―44.8 million 
people received OASI benefits, 10.6 million received DI benefits, and 48.7 
million were covered under Medicare.‖63 
Prior to the enactment of Social Security, the proposed funding 
structure, i.e. the tax plan, created discord among policymakers who were 
considering ―how to schedule the taxes over time and how to blend payroll 
taxes and general revenues.‖64 At a time when ninety-five percent of 
Americans did not pay income taxes, a payroll tax seemed to be the most 
viable option for generating revenue; various proposals, however, showed 
the program incurring a deficit by 1967.
65
 President Roosevelt insisted on 
a structure that would not allow a deficit, and committee staff ultimately 
developed a plan in which employees and employers would pay a 
combined 2% tax on the first $3000 of income (each paying 1%), with the 
combined percentage increasing to 5% by 1957 (whereby the employee 
and the employer would each pay 2.5%).
66
 As of January 1, 2013, 
employees and employers each pay a 7.65% payroll tax to fund Social 
Security and Medicare programs.
67
 
 
 
§ 3101(a)-(b) (establishing the same percentages for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and 
Hospital Insurance, respectively).  
 59. TRUSTEES‘ REPORTS, supra note 16, at 1. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. Part B covers physician and outpatient services, while Part D covers prescription drug 
benefits. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Edward D. Berkowitz, The Historical Development of Social Security in the United States, in 
SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 25, at 22, 24.  
 65. See Berkowitz, The Historical Development of Social Security in the United States, in 
SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 25, at 22, 24. 
 66. Berkowitz, The Historical Development of Social Security in the United States, in SOCIAL 
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 25, at 22, 24.  
 67. Since 1990, the FICA tax rate has been 7.65% (including Social Security tax of 6.2% and 
hospital insurance tax of 1.45%) for employees and employers, or a combined percentage of 15.3%. 
See I.R.C. § 3101(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY & 
MEDICARE TAX RATES, available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/taxRates.html (website last 
modified Mar. 8, 2012). The payroll tax was lowered for the years 2011 and 2012 as part of the Tax 
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C. Severance Payments 
With this background on Social Security, Medicare, and FICA in mind, 
the ensuing discussion will require an understanding of the other major 
element of this issue: severance payments. As if the sociopolitical-
sensitivity level were not high enough by virtue of the payroll tax and its 
role in funding social welfare programs, adding severance payments to the 
equation introduces the complication of post-recession recovery and 
ongoing unemployment issues. 
The term ―severance payments‖ encompasses a broad range of 
payments to individuals whose employment has been terminated in some 
way. The payments can arise from layoffs, as part of an early retirement 
program, or they can resemble a pension benefit.
68
 Generally speaking, 
however, this type of payment is governed by an employment contract and 
is strictly a matter between the employer and the employee.
69
 Broadly 
speaking, severance packages provide a form of security for both the 
employer and the employee, hence their place in many employment 
agreements.
70
 
 
 
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-312, 
124 Stat. 3296. This reduced the Social Security tax withholding from 6.2% of wages to 4.2% of 
wages. The hospital insurance tax remained at 1.45%, so each of employers and employees paid a total 
of 5.65% in 2011 and 2012. See PAYROLL TAX CUT TO BOOST TAKE-HOME PAY FOR MOST 
WORKERS; NEW WITHOLDING DETAILS NOW AVAILABLE ON IRS.GOV, IR-2010-124 (Dec. 17, 2010), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Payroll-Tax-Cut-to-Boost-Take-Home-Pay-for-Most-Workers;-
New-Withholding-Details-Now-Available-on-IRS.gov. See also I.R.C. § 3111(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. V 
2012); I.R.C. § 3101(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); and supra text accompanying note 58. 
 68. Severance payments to corporate chief executives are a popular news item. These payments 
tend to be triggered by retirement, or by boards of directors asking the executive to step down. For a 
discussion of some of the largest CEO severance packages between 2001–2011, see generally 
Nathaniel Parish Flannery, Executive Compensation: The True Cost of the 10 Largest CEO Severance 
Packages of the Past Decade, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2012, 5:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
nathanielparishflannery/2012/01/19/billion-dollar-blowout-top-10-largest-ceo-severance-packages-of-
the-past-decade/ (noting that Jack Welch, formerly of General Electric, received $417 million in 
severance pay in 2001). When examining such figures, however, it is important to note that many of 
these executives‘ packages involve contractual benefits payable upon retirement. By contrast, this 
Note focuses on the taxability of severance payments paid upon an involuntary termination. For a 
detailed discussion of several CEOs‘ severance payments and the circumstances surrounding their 
departures, see Paul Hodgson & Greg Ruel, Twenty-One U.S. CEOs with Golden Parachutes of More 
Than $100 Million, GMI RATINGS (Jan. 2012), http://www3.gmiratings.com/home/2013/07/twenty-
one-u-s-ceos-with-golden-parachutes-of-more-than-100-million-jan-2012/ (cited in Flannery, supra). 
 69. See Wages: Severance Pay, DOL.GOV, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/severancepay 
.htm (last visited June 1, 2013). Severance pay is not required by the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 
also elaws: Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor, DOL.GOV, http://www.dol.gov/elaws/faq/esa/flsa/007 
.htm (last visited June 1, 2013).  
 70. For a discussion of three mutually-exclusive economic hypotheses as to the purpose of 
severance payments, see THE WORLD BANK, REFORMING SEVERANCE PAY: AN INTERNATIONAL 
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This Note is focused on severance payments made either in conjunction 
with an involuntary layoff or those made to employees who voluntarily 
terminate their employment; pension-type payments are beyond the scope 
of this discussion.
71
 Further, it is a particular subset of severance payments 
that is at issue—payments classified as ―supplemental unemployment 
compensation benefits,‖ (or ―SUB payments‖), as defined in I.R.C. 
§ 3402(o)(2)(A): 
[A]mounts which are paid to an employee, pursuant to a plan to 
which the employer is a party, because of an employee's involuntary 
separation from employment (whether or not such separation is 
temporary), resulting directly from a reduction in force, the 
discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other similar conditions, 
but only to the extent such benefits are includible in the employee‘s 
gross income.
72
 
In its 2008 decision in CSX Corporation v. United States,
73
 the Federal 
Circuit held that even if a particular severance payment meets the I.R.C. 
§ 3402(o) definition of ―supplemental unemployment benefits,‖ it is 
within the scope of the definition of ―wages‖ under FICA74 and therefore 
subject to FICA withholding.
75
 The Sixth Circuit‘s 2012 decision in In re 
Quality Stores, Inc.
76
 created a split among the circuit courts of appeal 
 
 
PERSPECTIVE 43–46 (Robert Holzmann and Milan Vodopivec eds., 2012). The hypotheses are: (1) a 
―social benefit program,‖ (2) a ―human resource instrument,‖ and (3) an ―employment protection 
device.‖ Id. at 44–46. First, the social benefit plan hypothesis discusses the role of some employers in 
creating a ―safety net‖ where ―public systems were minimal or nonexistent.‖ Id. at 45. The human 
resources instrument hypothesis takes both a short-term and long-term approach. In the short-run, 
severance plans ―make[] mass dismissals socially and politically more palatable,‖ when needed for 
restructuring purposes. Id. The longer-term human resources aspect is the preservation of employee 
morale and ―avoiding potential damage caused by departing workers if they are not appropriately 
compensated.‖ Id. Finally, the hypothesis of severance payments as an employment protection device 
postulates that the costs of terminating an employee may serve to protect employees; ―[f]iring costs 
emerge from the mandated benefits, the permitted causes . . . and ruling by the courts on what is a fair 
dismissal.‖ Id. at 46. It is noted, however, that this hypothesis ―carries a negative connotation with 
economists.‖ Id. 
 71. In the nature of pensions, tenure-termination payments have been the subject of controversy 
concerning whether they are taxable as FICA wages. For a discussion of this issue and related cases, 
see generally Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Academic Early Retirement: Do Tenure Buyout 
Payments Warrant Unique Employment Tax Treatment?, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 169 (2010) and 
Nicole Occhuizzo, Taxing Tenure: An Examination of How the Federal Insurance Contribution Act 
(FICA) Has Been Applied to Tenure Buyouts, 62 TAX LAW. 189 (2008). 
 72. I.R.C. § 3402(o)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying 
text. 
 73. 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 74. See infra Part IV. 
 75. CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1344–45. 
 76. 693 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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when it concluded that severance payments that fit the § 3402(o) definition 
of SUB payments are not ―wages‖ and therefore not subject to FICA.77 
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Federal Circuit: CSX Corporation v. United States 
In the 1980s, CSX Corporation (―CSX‖) faced financial difficulties and 
implemented certain ―financial arrangements that encouraged employees 
to separate from the company, while cushioning the effect on the 
employees of the company‘s reduction in the size of its workforce.‖78 
Simply put, CSX offered payments to employees who left the company 
and the dispute before the court arose from the proper tax treatment of 
these payments.
79
 
There were several categories of payments at issue in CSX. First were 
employees, who were laid off and were paid ―a percentage of their average 
monthly compensation‖ for a length of time that ―depended on each 
employee‘s length of service.‖80 Second were employees whose positions 
were eliminated, but who ―remained subject to recall on an as-needed 
basis.‖81 This second category of employees remained on the active 
payroll and were guaranteed a ―minimum compensation per pay period.‖82 
Third were employees who were offered payments for agreeing to leave 
their position. These employees could be further categorized: some 
received the payment ―in lieu of layoff benefits,‖ while others accepted the 
payment in lieu of remaining in their current positions.
83
 Fourth, certain 
managerial employees were terminated—first voluntarily, in exchange for 
 
 
 77. Id. at 613. 
 78. CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1330. This case involved tax paid under FICA and the Railroad 
Retirement Act (RRTA). The court considered only the portion of the dispute relating to FICA, as the 
parties agreed that ―wages‖ under FICA and ―compensation‖ under RRTA have the same meaning for 
determining the issue of this case. Id. at 1330–31.  
 79. Id. at 1330. 
 80. Id. at 1332. 
 81. Id. 
 82. CSX Corp., Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 208, 219 (2002). 
 83. CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1332. The employees opting to receive the separation payment in lieu 
of layoff benefits were not electing to separate from employment, but ―to resolve the uncertainty 
associated with a separation from employment of an indefinite duration (i.e., the layoff) in favor of a 
permanent separation.‖ Id. (quoting CSX Corp., 52 Fed. Cl. at 220). These payments are contrasted to 
payments made to employees who chose to leave their positions, thus making the termination 
voluntary. See id.  
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a severance payment, or later, involuntarily, also accompanied by a 
severance payment.
84
 
In two opinions, considering non-managerial payments
85
 and 
managerial payments,
86
 respectively, the trial court first considered each of 
the severance payments individually to determine whether they were 
―SUB‖ payments, as that term is defined in I.R.C. § 3402(o).87 The trial 
court ultimately concluded that SUB payments are not taxable as ―wages‖ 
under FICA, so the payments that it had classified as SUB payments were 
not ―wages,‖ while other payments may be taxable.88 
The first category of non-managerial employees‘ payment, 
compensation given to employees who were laid off, was classified as a 
SUB payment by the trial court.
89
 The second category, payments made to 
employees whose positions were eliminated but who were subject to recall 
as needed, were not classified as SUB payments.
90
 The third category of 
payments, offered to some employees in lieu of layoff benefits and to 
others as compensation for agreeing to terminate their position, was 
classified by the trial court as SUB payments in the former instance, but 
not in the latter.
91
  
The lower court ultimately held that supplemental unemployment 
benefits are not wages for the purposes of FICA, and the payments it 
classified as SUB payments were then not subject to the FICA tax.
92
 
Accordingly, based on the definition of ―supplemental unemployment 
compensation benefits‖ in I.R.C. § 3402(o), a payment is not taxable under 
FICA if it (1) is paid to an employee, ―pursuant to a plan to which the 
employer is a party;‖ (2) the payment is ―because of an employee‘s 
involuntary separation from employment . . . resulting directly from a 
 
 
 84. Id. at 1332. 
 85. CSX Corp., 52 Fed. Cl. 208. 
 86. CSX Corp., Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 341 (2003).  
 87. See CSX Corp., 52 Fed. Cl. at 218; CSX Corp., 58 Fed. Cl. at 346. 
 88. See CSX Corp., 52 Fed. Cl. at 216 (―[N]o FICA taxes apply to such payments‖). 
 89. Id. at 217–18. 
 90. Id. at 219. 
 91. CSX Corp., 52 Fed. Cl. 220-21. Payments made to employees in lieu of layoff benefits were 
considered SUB payments, which the lower court concluded was not taxable. Id. at 220. By contrast, 
payments made to employees in lieu of remaining in their existing position were not SUB payments, 
and thus taxable. Id. The decision to terminate employment was the employee‘s, so it was not 
―involuntary‖ under § 3402(o). Id. The court construed payments to managerial employees 
consistently with those made to non-managerial employees; payments made to managerial employees 
who voluntarily opted for the payment rather than to remain in their current positions were not SUB 
payments, while the payments made to employees who were laid off were SUB payments. See CSX 
Corp., 58 Fed. Cl. at 346. 
 92. CSX Corp., 52 Fed. Cl. at 216. 
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reduction in force,‖ the discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other 
similar conditions; and (3) the employee is actually separated from 
employment, either temporarily or permanently.
93
 
On appeal in 2008, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court 
holdings, concluding that supplemental unemployment benefits are within 
the scope of ―wages‖ taxable under FICA, primarily because the definition 
of SUB payments in § 3402(o), an income tax provision, is inapplicable to 
FICA.
94
 
B. Sixth Circuit: In re Quality Stores 
Quality Stores, ―the largest agricultural-specialty supplier in the 
country,‖ had an involuntary Chapter 11 petition filed against it in October 
2001.
95
 ―Prior to November 2001,‖ the court explained, ―Quality Stores 
[had] closed sixty-three stores and nine distribution centers and [had] 
terminated seventy-five employees in the corporate office.‖96 Quality 
Stores later closed its 311 remaining stores, three distribution centers, and 
terminated the rest of its employees.
97
 The company ―made severance 
payments to those employees whose employment was involuntarily 
terminated‖ under two separate plans.98 These severance payments 
―resulted directly from a reduction in force or the discontinuance of a plant 
or operation,‖ by stipulation of the parties.99 
The two separate severance payment plans were categorized as the 
―Pre-Petition Severance Plan‖ and the ―Post-Petition Severance Plan.‖100 
The Pre-Petition Plan provided for payment based on ―job grade and 
management level in the organization.‖101 The Post-Petition Plan ―was 
 
 
 93. Id. at 218. These elements are based strictly on the definition of ―supplemental 
unemployment benefits‖ in I.R.C. § 3402 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).  
 94. CSX Corp., Inc. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 95. In re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.; see also In re Quality Stores, Inc., 383 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008). 
 98. Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 608. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. The court noted: 
The President and CEO received eighteen months of severance pay. Senior management executives 
received twelve months of severance pay, while all other managers and employees received one 
week of severance pay for each full year of service. These severance payments were not tied to the 
receipt of state unemployment compensation, and they were not attributable to the provision of any 
particular services by the employees. Quality Stores made the severance payments on the normal 
payroll schedule. Salaried employees received an average of 11.4 weeks of severance pay, while 
hourly employees received an average of 4.2 weeks of severance pay. 
Id. 
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designed to encourage employees to defer their job searches and dedicate 
their efforts and attention to the company by assuring them that they 
would receive severance pay if their jobs were eliminated.‖102 
Quality Stores withheld FICA taxes from the employees‘ payments and 
made the employer contribution on the severance payments. It filed a tax 
return for these payments, and the IRS neither denied nor made the return. 
Quality Stores then filed an adversary action in the bankruptcy court for 
return of the FICA taxes paid, arguing that the severance payments were 
not ―wages‖ and, therefore, were not subject to FICA.103 At issue in the 
adversary action was $1,000,125 in taxes paid, including both the 
employer share and the employees‘ share.104 
In the adversary action, the bankruptcy court found that the payments 
at issue were SUB payments and that SUB payments were not subject to 
FICA taxation.
105
 Because this decision was released just before the 
Federal Circuit decision in CSX Corporation v. United States,
106
 the 
Government moved for reconsideration after CSX Corporation, which the 
bankruptcy court granted.
107
 The court ratified its decision on 
 
 
 102. Id. To be eligible for payment under the Post-Petition Plan, ―an employee was required to 
complete the last day of service as scheduled.‖ Id. Under this plan: 
Company officers received between six and twelve months of severance pay, while full-time 
salaried and hourly employees who had been employed for at least two years received one 
week of severance pay for every full year of service, up to a maximum of ten weeks for 
salaried employees and five weeks for hourly employees. Those workers with less than two 
years of service received one week of severance pay. 
Id. at 608–09. Like the Pre-Petition Plan, these payments ―were not tied to the receipt of state 
unemployment compensation, nor were they attributable to the provision of any particular services.‖ 
Id. at 609. The payments ―were paid in a lump sum . . . because the companies were liquidating and it 
was not practical administratively to pay the amounts over time.‖ Id. In sum, ―on average, salaried 
employees received 5.2 weeks of severance pay, while hourly employees received 3.1 weeks of 
severance pay. About 900 employees did not receive any severance pay because they were hired 
immediately by successor companies.‖ Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. Quality Stores had permission from 1,850 of its former employees to file a tax return on 
their behalf. The court noted: 
 Of the total $1,000,125 in FICA tax at issue, $382,362 is attributed to severance 
payments made under the Pre–Petition Severance Plan, consisting of $214,000 for the 
employer share and $168,362 for the employee share. Further, of the total amount of FICA 
tax at issue, $617,763 is attributed to severance payments made under the Post–Petition 
Severance Plan, consisting of $357,127 for the employer share and $260,636 for the 
employee share. 
Id.  
 105. In re Quality Stores, 383 B.R. 67, 77–78 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008). 
 106. See CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (dated Mar. 6, 2008); Quality Stores, 383 
B.R. 67 (dated Mar. 3, 2008). 
 107. In re Quality Stores, Inc., 105 A.F.T.R. 2d 2010-1237 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008); see also In 
re Quality Stores, Inc., 424 B.R. 237, 240 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (discussing this procedural history). 
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reconsideration, and on appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy 
court‘s decision.108 
On further appeal, the Sixth Circuit reconsidered whether the payments 
at issue fit the definition of a ―supplemental unemployment benefit‖ and 
looked to the statutory language of the federal income tax withholding 
provisions
109
 and the corresponding Treasury regulations
110
 as a first 
source. The court then parsed this definition into five elements that 
determine whether a payment is a SUB payment: 
Congress has provided that a SUB payment is: (1) an amount paid 
to an employee; (2) pursuant to an employer‘s plan; (3) because of 
an employee‘s involuntary separation from employment, whether 
temporary or permanent; (4) resulting directly from a reduction in 
force, the discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other similar 
conditions; and (5) included in the employee‘s gross income.111 
The court concluded that all of the severance payments paid by Quality 
Stores to its former employees fit within this five-element test and that 
designation of a payment as a SUB payment means that it is not within the 
scope of ―wages‖ under FICA.112 
IV. AUTHORITY AND ANALYSIS: THE STATUTORY PUZZLE 
At its core, the issue of whether SUB payments are taxable under FICA 
is one of statutory interpretation that demands an in-depth analysis of the 
text of the statute itself. While imposing a tax on ―wages‖ may seem to be 
a relatively straightforward mechanism, there has been a great deal of 
 
 
 108. Quality Stores, 424 B.R. at 246. 
 109. See In re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d 605, 618 (6th Cir. 2012); I.R.C. § 3402(o)(2)(A) 
(2006 & Supp. V 2012); see also supra text accompanying note 72. 
 110. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 618. Treasury Regulation § 31.3401(a)–1(b)(14)(ii) is 
identical to I.R.C. § 3402(o)(2)(A). 
 111. Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 611. 
 112. The court analyzed these elements as applied to the payments at issue: 
The parties stipulated below that: (1) Quality Stores made the payments to employees; 
(2) pursuant to company plans; (3) because of the employees‘ permanent separation from 
employment; and (4) resulting directly from a reduction in force or the discontinuance of a 
plant or operation. Although the parties‘ stipulation did not contain any reference to gross 
income as contemplated by the fifth element of the statutory test, as a matter of law the SUB 
payments were included in the employees‘ gross incomes. See I.R.C. § 61 (generally ―gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived‖ with certain inapplicable 
exceptions). The statutory definition does not require that SUB payments be tied to an 
employee's receipt of state unemployment compensation benefits, nor does the statute make 
any distinction between periodic payments or one-time payments made in a lump sum. 
Id. at 611–12. 
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litigation on specific factual scenarios and whether they fall within the 
definitions of employee, employer, and wages, for example.
113
 Generally, 
on these issues, courts have favored a broad interpretation of FICA to 
effect the remedial policy goals of the Social Security Act.
114
 The context 
in which courts must decide whether severance payments are subject to 
FICA taxation requires due consideration of the status quo ante and a mind 
toward the ensuing remedial goal of Social Security and Medicare.
115
 
FICA imposes a tax ―on the income of every individual . . . equal to 
[certain] percentages of the wages . . . received by him with respect to 
employment.‖116 For the purpose of this tax, the term ―wages‖ is defined 
as ―all remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all 
 
 
 113. See I.R.C. § 3121 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 114. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Soc. Sec. 
Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1946)) (noting that the definitions under I.R.C. § 3121(b) are 
interpreted broadly); see also United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) abrogation recognized in 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). In Silk, the Court considered the definition 
of ―employee‖ for the purposes of a Social Security tax, and emphasized the policy goals of the Social 
Security Act. See Silk, 331 U.S. at 711–12. The Court reiterated some of the themes of necessity that 
resounded in the political discourse surrounding the enactment of the Social Security Act: 
 The Social Security Act of 1935 was the result of long consideration by the President and 
Congress of the evil of the burdens that rest upon large numbers of our people because of the 
insecurities of modern life, particularly old age and unemployment. It was enacted in an effort 
to coordinate the forces of government and industry for solving the problems. The principal 
method adopted by Congress to advance its purpose was to provide for periodic payments in 
the nature of annuities to the elderly and compensation to workers during periods of 
unemployment. Employment taxes, such as we are here considering, are necessary to produce 
the revenue for federal participation in the program of alleviation. 
Id. at 710 (internal footnote omitted); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. In addition to the 
enactment discourse, the language in Silk also echoed the Court‘s earlier decision in Charles C. 
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), in which the Court upheld a Social Security tax as 
within Congress‘s power to tax for the general welfare; see supra text accompanying note 23. 
 115. Principles of statutory interpretation have long recognized the competing interests at stake in 
any particular tax law. See, e.g., HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 515 (2d ed. 1911) (noting that tax laws should be ―construed strictly‖ 
to the extent that they may ―deprive the citizen of his property by summary proceedings,‖ but 
―otherwise tax laws ought to be construed with fairness, if not liberality, in order to carry out the 
intention of the legislature and further the important public interests which such statutes subserve.‖); 
see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 359 (2012). Garner and Scalia framed the general rule as requiring that ―‗exemptions from 
taxation are to be construed narrowly‘ . . . and that doubts regarding them ‗must be resolved against 
the taxpayer.‘‖ Id. (internal footnotes omitted). Scalia and Garner observed that the applicable rule on 
this topic had previously been to resolve doubts ―in favor of the exemption‖ and that the rule had 
reversed course over time. Id. at 359–60. They concluded:  
Without some textual indication, there is no reason to give statutory exceptions anything 
other than a fair (rather than a ―narrow‖) interpretation. The expressions to the contrary find 
their source either in a judicial proclivity to make difficult interpretive questions easy, or else 
in an inappropriate judicial antagonism to limitations on favored legislation. 
Id. at 363. Garner and Scalia instead suggest ignoring this rule entirely. Id. at 362. 
 116. I.R.C. § 3101(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
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remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash.‖117 
The central issue in these cases, and in this Note, is whether the income 
tax provision that includes ―supplemental unemployment compensation 
benefits‖ (SUB payments) under a section that extends income tax 
withholding to payments ―other than wages‖ and requires treatment of the 
payments ―as if [they] were a payment of wages‖ can mean that SUB 
payments are not, in fact, wages and, by extension, are not within the 
scope of FICA‘s taxation on wages.118  
This issue is complex for several reasons, even aside from the highly 
apparent complexity of the just-stated argument. First, as noted, the 
provision addressing treatment of SUB payments falls under the income 
tax provisions—SUB payments are not addressed in the FICA tax 
provisions. The first wrinkle, then, is whether the income tax definitions 
apply to FICA provisions; to address this issue, Subpart A will discuss the 
bridge—Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States, and the circuit courts‘ 
analyses thereof.
119
 The second challenge in this issue is the sheer 
complexity of the tax provisions involved. Subpart B will provide an 
analysis of the text of the relevant tax code provisions, followed by a 
discussion of the courts‘ respective statutory interpretations. Finally, the 
issue is complicated by the ―reverse-course‖ revenue rulings that the IRS 
has published since the 1950s, which will be discussed in Subpart C, but 
generally and as analyzed by the circuit courts.
120
 
A. The Link Between FICA and Income Tax Provisions: Rowan 
Companies v. United States 
The Supreme Court in Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States held 
that Congress intended for FICA, FUTA (the Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act)
121
 and the income tax provisions to have the same definition of
 
 
 117. I.R.C. § 3121(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 118. I.R.C. § 3402(o) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 119. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).  
 120. In re Quality Stores, Inc., 424 B.R. 237, 240 (W.D. Mich. 2010). The court observed: ―The 
fact that the Internal Revenue Service has itself charted a path of ‗reverse-course‘ rulings on this issue 
since the 1950s only adds to the difficulties faced by the courts in attempting to reach a reasoned 
resolution by explaining and accounting for this repeated change in agency position.‖ Id. 
 121. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act, while relevant to the topics at issue, is beyond the 
scope of this Note. FUTA is not paid by employees and it is not deducted from their wages. FUTA is 
paid only by employers, and is separate from Social Security and Medicare taxes paid under the FICA 
tax. Employment Taxes, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed 
/Employment-Taxes-2 (last updated Nov. 4, 2013).  
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wages.
122
 In Rowan, an employer provided meals and lodging for 
employees working on offshore oil rigs, but ―did not include the value of 
the meals and lodging in computing its employees‘ ‗wages‘‖ for FICA 
withholding purposes.
123
 When conducting an audit, the IRS included this 
value in the calculation of wages for FICA, but not for income tax 
withholding, acting ―consistently with . . . Treasury Regulations that 
interpret the definition of ‗wages‘ in FICA and FUTA to include the value 
of these meals and lodging, whereas the substantially identical definition 
of ‗wages‘ in [the income-tax withholding provisions] is interpreted by 
Treasury Regulations to exclude this value.‖124 The Court held, and the 
Government conceded, that the exclusion of the cost of meals and lodging 
in the calculation of wages for income tax withholding was proper.
125
 Yet, 
despite its concession as to the income tax calculation, the Government 
still argued that the value of the meals and lodging should be included in 
the calculation of wages for FICA taxation purposes, based on Treasury 
Regulations §§ 31.3121(a)-1(f) and 31.3306(b)-(1)(f).
126
 The Court noted, 
 
 
 122. Rowan, 452 U.S. at 257. The Court concluded: 
In sum, Congress intended in both the Revenue Act of 1942 and the Current Tax Payment Act 
of 1943 to coordinate the income-tax withholding system with FICA and FUTA. In both 
instances, Congress did so to promote simplicity and ease of administration. Contradictory 
interpretations of substantially identical definitions do not serve that interest. It would be 
extraordinary for a Congress pursuing this interest to intend, without ever saying so, for 
identical definitions to be interpreted differently. 
Id. 
 123. Id. at 249. 
 124. Id. at 250 (internal footnote omitted). 
 125. Id. at 250–51. The Court looked to Treasury Regulation §31.3401(a)-1(b)(9), under which an 
employer excludes the value of meals or lodging from ―wages‖ if the employee also excludes that 
value from his or her gross income. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-1(b)(9) (2012). In order for an employee 
to exclude the value from gross income, the Court looked to the ―convenience-of-the-employer rule‖ 
of I.R.C. § 119, which provides for exclusion ―if the employer furnished both the meals and lodging 
for its own convenience, furnished the meals on its business premises, and required the employee to 
accept the lodging on the business premises as a condition of employment.‖ Rowan, 452 U.S. at 251. 
The Court found that the requirements of § 119 were satisfied, meaning employees would exclude the 
value from their gross wages, and, in turn, the employer should exclude the value from wages, as well. 
See id. 
 126. Id. at 251–52. These regulations applied to FICA and FUTA, respectively, and were codified 
at 26 CFR §§ 31.3121(a)-1(f) and 31.3306(b)-1(f) (1980). The regulations were (and are) identical and 
provided:  
Ordinarily, facilities or privileges (such as entertainment, medical services, or so-called 
‗courtesy‘ discounts on purchases), furnished or offered by an employer to his employees 
generally, are not considered as remuneration for employment if such facilities or privileges 
are of relatively small value and are offered or furnished by the employer merely as a means 
of promoting the health, good will, contentment, or efficiency of his employees. The term 
‗facilities or privileges,‘ however, does not ordinarily include the value of meals or lodging 
furnished, for example, to restaurant or hotel employees, or to seamen or other employees 
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―If valid, these regulations dictate that the value of the meals and lodging 
provided by petitioner to its employees on offshore rigs was includable in 
‗wages‘ as defined in FICA and FUTA, even though excludable from 
‗wages‘ under the substantially identical definition in § 3401(a) for 
income-tax withholding.‖127 In other words, despite the nearly identical 
statutory language in the FICA, FUTA, and income tax definitions of 
―wages,‖ the regulations at issue would cause these provisions to operate 
inconsistently. 
After discussing the legislative history of the Acts establishing income-
tax withholding and the congressional intent ―to promote simplicity and 
ease of administration,‖ the Court held that ―[i]t would be extraordinary 
for a Congress pursuing this interest to intend, without ever saying so, for 
identical definitions to be interpreted differently.‖128 The Court concluded, 
―The plain language and legislative histories of the relevant Acts indicate 
that Congress intended its definition to be interpreted in the same manner 
for FICA and FUTA as for income-tax withholding.‖129 In reaching that 
result, the Court found the Treasury Regulations to be invalid, as they ―fail 
to implement the statutory definition of ‗wages‘ in a consistent or 
reasonable manner.‖130 
While discussing a different factual issue from that presented here, 
Rowan stands for the proposition that the definitions of ―wages‖ between 
the income tax provisions and FICA are functionally identical.
131
 This 
forms the basis for taxpayers to make a statutory argument based on 
income tax provisions, extended via Rowan to FICA.
132
 
1. Federal Circuit and Sixth Circuit Analyses of Rowan 
Although the courts ultimately reach different conclusions on the 
overarching issue before them, the Federal Circuit and Sixth Circuit 
agreed on the role of Rowan. The arguments presented by the Government 
 
 
aboard vessels, since generally these items constitute an appreciable part of the total 
remuneration of such employees. 
Rowan, 452 U.S. at 252. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 257. 
 129. Id. at 263. 
 130. Id. The reasoning here was that since the Treasury Regulations for FICA and FUTA could be 
read to include in ―wages‖ some payments that were not included in ―wages‖ under the income tax 
provision, the regulations were invalid as inconsistent with the statutory language, which the Court 
interpreted as requiring these definitions to be the same.  
 131. See supra text accompanying note 129.  
 132. See infra Part IV.B. 
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in each of these two cases centered on the legacy of Rowan in light of the 
1983 ―decoupling amendment‖ to FICA.133 This amendment provides: 
―Nothing in the regulations prescribed for purposes of chapter 24 (relating 
to income tax withholding) which provides an exclusion from ‗wages‘ as 
used in such chapter shall be construed to require a similar exclusion from 
‗wages‘ in the regulations prescribed for [FICA].‖134 The legislative 
history to the 1983 decoupling amendment shows a congressional intent to 
treat ―wages‖ differently under FICA and the income tax provisions.135 
This provision, which ―gives the IRS the ability to establish distinctions 
between the two statutory definitions‖ of wages under FICA and the 
federal income tax provisions, is said to supersede Rowan.
136
  
When confronted with this argument, however, the lower courts in both 
circuits noted the need for an applicable regulation, which has not yet been 
promulgated.
137
 Without such a regulation, ―[s]imply put, the holding of 
Rowan remains in place.‖138 The Sixth Circuit in Quality Stores followed 
this reasoning outright.
139
 The Federal Circuit in CSX Corp. relied on one 
of its earlier holdings that noted there was no regulation to implement the 
decoupling provision, and thereby rejected the contention that Rowan‘s 
 
 
 133. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98–21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).  
 134. I.R.C. § 3121(a)(23) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (parenthetical in original). 
 135. ―Since the security system has objectives which are significantly different from the objective 
underlying the income tax withholding rules . . . amounts exempt from income tax withholding should 
not be exempt from FICA unless Congress provides an explicit FICA tax exclusion.‖ S. Rep. No. 98–
23, at 42 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 183; H.R. Rep. No. 98–25(I), at 80 (1983), 
reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 299. The court cited both reports in CSX Corp. v. United States, 
518 F.3d 1328, 1343 (Fed Cir. 2008)). 
 136. In re Quality Stores, Inc., 383 B.R. 67, 78 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008). The court 
characterized the argument as: ―According to the IRS, these amendments contain a ‗decoupling‘ 
provision that specifically rejects Rowan‘s conclusion that wages should be defined the same for 
purposes of income tax withholding and FICA taxation.‖ Id. at 73; see also Canisius Coll. v. United 
States, 799 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1986) (―Congress in 1983 overturned the general premise of Rowan by 
enacting provisions that ‗decoupled‘ the interpretations of FICA and FUTA wages from the 
interpretation of wages for income-tax purposes.‖). 
 137. See Quality Stores, 383 B.R. at 78 (―Although the ‗decoupling‘ provision gives the IRS the 
ability to establish distinctions between the two statutory definitions, such distinctions must be made 
through the promulgation of valid regulations. No such regulations exist.‖); see also CSX Corp., Inc. 
v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 208, 213 (2002). The court characterized the decoupling provision as ―not 
self-executing‖ and noted:  
[I]ts operation depends on the promulgation of regulations that in fact establish distinctions 
between wages for income-tax withholding purposes and wages for FICA-tax withholding 
purposes. Absent such regulations, this court has no basis for distinguishing between the 
content of the term ―wages‖ for income-tax withholding purposes and the content of that term 
for FICA-tax withholding purposes. 
Id. 
 138. CSX Corp., 52 Fed. Cl. at 213. 
 139. See In re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d 605, 618–19 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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central premise had become invalid.
140
 In accord with its precedent, the 
Federal Circuit Court noted its disagreement with the Government‘s 
argument that ―after 1983, the term ‗wages‘ in FICA must be interpreted 
without reference to the same term in the income tax withholding 
statutes.‖141 
The circuit courts‘ agreement on this issue is important. First, it 
solidifies the issue as one primarily of statutory interpretation, since the 
courts are in agreement as to the primary starting point.
142
 Second, it is 
clear that the respective outcomes of these cases may have been different 
in the presence of a relevant Treasury Regulation, which has important 
implications for resolving the circuit split down the road.
143
 
B. The Heart of the Debate: The Tax Code Statutory Analysis 
Accepting the proposition from Rowan that FICA and the federal 
income tax provisions have the same definition of ―wages,‖ the next step 
in the analysis is to understand that definition.
144
 The income tax definition 
(§ 3401) and the FICA definition (§ 3121) both provide that wages are ―all 
remuneration‖ ―for services performed by an employee for his 
employer,‖145 or ―for employment‖146 (respectively), ―including the cash 
value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other 
than cash.‖147 Determining the scope of ―wages‖ is essential to the tax 
provisions, as wages provide the basis for federal income tax withholding 
and for FICA tax withholding; the two taxes are automatically deducted 
from employees‘ pay.148 The issue, then, seems relatively 
 
 
 140. CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1344, (citing Anderson v. United States, 929 F.2d 648, 650 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (holding that the 1983 amendments decoupled the two definitions only insomuch as it 
―allow[ed] the Treasury to promulgate regulations to provide for different exclusions from ‗wages‘ 
under FICA than under the income tax withholding laws‖). It is interesting to note that the Federal 
Circuit in CSX Corp. was bound by its earlier decision in Anderson, which, as noted, affirmed the 
proposition of Rowan. While the CSX Corp. court was able to find that severance payments are wages, 
even though it agreed with CSX that Rowan was applicable, the analysis may have been less strained if 
the court had been able to disavow Rowan. 
 141. Id. at 1344–45. 
 142. See id. Because the court in CSX Corp. was bound by its precedent that Rowan still stands, its 
analysis took a different approach, relying more heavily on what it saw as the logic of the statutory 
analysis, combined with the IRS positions stated in revenue rulings. See infra Part IV.C. 
 143. See infra Part V. 
 144. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
 145. I.R.C. § 3401(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).  
 146. I.R.C. § 3121(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 147. I.R.C. §§ 3121, 3401 (parenthetical in original). 
 148. See I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (―[E]very employer making payment of 
wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax determined in accordance with tables or 
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straightforward—are severance payments ―wages,‖ and thus subject to 
FICA withholding? The definition of ―wages,‖ itself, does not directly 
answer this question, as ―remuneration for employment‖ does not 
explicitly include severance payments. Of course, FICA is silent on the 
issue as well, but the more expansive income tax chapter provides a 
starting point; since §§ 3401 (income tax provisions) and 3121 (FICA) 
have the same definition of wages, per Rowan, comparing statutory 
treatment of ―wages‖ across the two provisions is a sound approach. 
Starting, then, with the income tax provisions, § 3402(o) provides for 
an extension of federal income tax withholding to ―certain payments other 
than wages.‖149 Under that section, these non-wage payments ―shall be 
treated as if [they] were a payment of wages by an employer to an 
employee for a payroll period.‖150 Treating these payments as if they were 
wages means that the employer withholds an established percentage of the 
payments as federal income tax.
151
 Section 3402(o)(1) lists three specific 
types of payments that should be treated as if they are wages:  
(A) any supplemental unemployment compensation benefit paid to 
an individual, 
(B) any payment of an annuity to an individual, if at the time the 
payment is made a request that such annuity be subject to 
withholding under this chapter is in effect, and 
(C) any payment to an individual of sick pay which does not 
constitute wages (determined without regard to this subsection), if 
at the time the payment is made a request that such sick pay be 
subject to withholding under this chapter is in effect. . . .
152
 
The inclusion of ―supplemental unemployment compensation benefits‖ 
is the link to the discussion at issue. Section 3402(o) defines supplemental 
unemployment compensation benefits as: 
amounts which are paid to an employee, pursuant to a plan to which 
the employer is a party, because of an employee's involuntary 
separation from employment (whether or not such separation is 
 
 
computational procedures prescribed by the [Treasury] Secretary.‖); see also I.R.C. § 3102(a) (2006 & 
Supp. V 2012) (―[T]he tax . . . shall be collected by the employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the 
amount of the tax from the wages as and when paid.‖). 
 149. I.R.C. § 3402(o) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).  
 150. I.R.C. § 3402(o)(1)(C). 
 151. See I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).  
 152. I.R.C. § 3402(o)(1)(A)-(C). 
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temporary), resulting directly from a reduction in force, the 
discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other similar conditions, 
but only to the extent such benefits are includible in the employee's 
gross income.
153
 
By way of summary thus far, the analysis begins with Rowan, which 
stands for the proposition that ―wages‖ means the same thing under the 
income tax provisions and FICA.
154
 The next step is to determine whether 
severance payments are ―wages,‖ but neither the income tax provision nor 
FICA explicitly include this type of payment in its definition.
155
 The 
income tax provisions, however, provide for certain payments to be treated 
as if they are wages, and thus subject them to withholding, and 
supplemental unemployment compensation benefits are included in this 
list.
156
 
The question remains as to whether § 3402(o), an income tax 
provision, should also apply to FICA. One argument against similar 
treatment stems from the fact that FICA was amended in 1983 to add the 
so-called ―decoupling provision‖ to § 3121(a).157 The direct counter-
argument, as discussed, is that the decoupling amendment applies only to 
the extent that it ―allow[s] Treasury to promulgate regulations to provide 
for different exclusions from ‗wages‘ under FICA than under the income 
tax withholding laws,‖ but that no such regulation exists.158 The long-term 
role of the decoupling argument, therefore, is unresolved. But the Federal 
Circuit and Sixth Circuit are in agreement that without such a regulation, 
the decoupling amendment has not changed the fact that FICA and the 
income tax chapter have the same definition of ―wages.‖159  
The proposition that the FICA definition of ―wages‖ is identical to the 
income tax definition of ―wages‖ forms the basis for an indirect 
application of § 3402(o) to FICA‘s definition of wages. The argument 
contends that, because § 3402(o) provides that certain payments should be 
treated ―as if‖ they are wages must mean that they are not, in fact, 
wages.
160
 Even if § 3402(o) is not directly applicable to FICA, the 
 
 
 153. I.R.C. § 3402(o)(2)(A). 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
 155. See supra text accompanying note 147. 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 152–53. 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 133–35. 
 158. Anderson v. United States, 929 F.2d 648, 650 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoted in CSX Corp. v. 
United States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 139–41. 
 160. See, e.g., CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1341. The opposing sides to this argument appear to take 
counterintuitive positions, given the language in the income tax provisions. The Government seeks to 
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argument follows, it applies indirectly: these payments that are to be 
treated ―as if‖ they are wages under § 3402(o), are not wages under 
§ 3401, which is the general definition of wages for the federal income tax 
provisions.
161
 If these payments are not wages under § 3401 (income tax 
provisions), they cannot be wages under § 3101 (FICA), either, since these 
definitions are the same.
162
 Accordingly, severance payments should not 
be subject to FICA taxation, as they are not wages, because being ―wages‖ 
is a statutory prerequisite to FICA withholding.
163
 
This statutory analysis forms one of the bases for the major difference 
in approaches in the Federal Circuit and in the Sixth Circuit. Accordingly, 
their analyses will be discussed separately. 
1. Federal Circuit Statutory Analysis 
The court in CSX Corporation took the position that § 3402(o), which 
provides for withholding from certain payments other than wages, ―applies 
only for purposes of chapter 24 [the federal income tax provisions] and 
certain procedural provisions relating to chapter 24.‖164 The court 
continued: ―Congress‘s decision to restrict the scope of the rule set forth in 
Section 3402(o) to chapter 24 suggests that Congress did not intend that 
rule, or any implication that might be drawn from that rule, to be applied 
outside the context of income tax withholding.‖165 Under this approach, 
whether a type of payment fits within the § 3402(o) definition of SUB 
payments is not relevant to determining whether it is ―wages‖ under FICA, 
as § 3402(o) does not apply to FICA.  
The employer-taxpayer, CSX, argued for the indirect application 
previously discussed: because § 3402(o) provides for treatment of SUB 
 
 
establish that § 3402(o) does not apply to FICA. This may appear confusing, since the terms of 
§ 3402(o) result in income tax withholding from SUB payments, so one might think that if § 3402(o) 
applies to FICA, then it would result in withholding for FICA. Opponents of imposing FICA tax on 
SUB payments, by contrast, do seek to incorporate § 3402(o) into FICA, but strictly for definitional 
purposes, rather than operational effect. To avoid confusion, one must remember that the only overlap 
between FICA and the income tax provisions is their definitions—operation of provisions within a 
particular chapter do not apply to the tax code generally, unless otherwise specified. Section 3402(o) is 
not a generally applicable provision, so the arguments based on this section involve only the 
application of definitions.  
 161. See id. 
 162. See id.; see also Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 263 (1981). 
 163. See I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); see also Thomas W. Meagher & Clara J. 
Kim, SUB Plans Resurface in Tough Economic Times, 37 TAX MGMT. COMP. PLAN. J. 150, 154 
(2009) (briefly summarizing the argument). 
 164. CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1341. 
 165. Id. 
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payments as if they are wages, they must not be wages as defined in 
§ 3401, and since § 3401 has the same definition as the FICA provision 
(§ 3121), per Rowan, the severance payments cannot be wages for FICA 
withholding.
166
 While agreeing with CSX‘s interpretation of Rowan,167 the 
court did not agree with its logic. The court noted:  
To say that all payments falling within a particular category shall be 
treated as if they were a payment of wages does not dictate, as a 
matter of language or logic, that none of the payments within that 
category would otherwise be wages. For example, to say that for 
some purposes all men shall be treated as if they were six feet tall 
does not imply that no men are six feet tall.
168
 
Thus, the court reasoned, while Rowan still stands, as does the proposition 
that ―wages‖ has the same meaning under the income tax provision as 
under FICA, the statutory interpretation offered by CSX was inaccurate 
and illogical.
169
 Rather, the court limited application of § 3402(o) to the 
federal income tax chapter and concluded that § 3402(o) ―does not require 
that FICA be interpreted to exclude from ‗wages‘ all payments that would 
satisfy the definition of SUB in section 3402(o)(2)(A).‖170 In short, 
whether a type of payment fits the § 3402(o) definition of SUB payments 
is not relevant to its classification as ―wages‖ under FICA. The court 
ultimately found that the payments at issue were subject to FICA 
taxation,
171
 aided in part by its interpretation of the Revenue Rulings 
discussed below.
172
 
2. Sixth Circuit Statutory Analysis 
The Sixth Circuit took a more direct approach. Recognizing an 
ambiguity in § 3402(o), the court turned to its title and the legislative 
history to guide its interpretation.
173
 As for the title, the court noted that 
use of the phrase ―other than wages‖ in the subsection titled ―Extension of 
 
 
 166. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 160–63. 
 167. See supra text accompanying note 141. 
 168. CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1342. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id.; see also supra Part IV (discussing the Federal Circuit‘s analysis of ―dismissal payments‖ 
as opposed to ―SUB payments‖ in light of applicable revenue rulings). 
 171. CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1352 (―[T]he payments to the various groups of employees who were 
accorded benefits in connection with CSX's reduction in force were all ‗wages‘ or ‗compensation‘ as 
those terms are used in FICA and the RRTA.‖). 
 172. See infra Part IV.C. 
 173. See In re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d 605, 612 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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withholding to certain payments other than wages‖ suggested 
acknowledgement that the payments listed in that section were not, in fact, 
wages.
174
 
Turning to the legislative history, the court concluded that Congress 
intended to enact § 3402(o) for the convenience of taxpayers.
175
 ―In light 
of this clear congressional intent,‖ the court approved the bankruptcy 
judge‘s reasoning that SUB payments are only treated as if they are wages 
for federal income tax withholding, but are not actually wages under that 
provision. Accordingly, given the effect of Rowan,
176
 they are also not 
wages under FICA.
177
 This conclusion is in direct conflict with the Federal 
Circuit‘s conclusion on the same issue.178  
In short, the basis for the courts‘ disagreement is twofold. First, the 
courts disagree as to whether the direct approach—applying § 3402(o) to 
FICA—is proper. Second, the courts disagree about the logic of the 
indirect approach—extending § 3402(o) (which addresses payments ―other 
than wages‖), via § 3401 (the definition of ―wages‖ for the federal income 
tax chapter), to § 3121 (the functionally identical definition of ―wages‖ for 
the FICA chapter).
179
 
This complicated issue of statutory interpretation might ordinarily be 
aided in part by looking to the IRS‘s revenue rulings on point. Such is not 
the case here, however. Despite analyzing the same rulings, regulations, 
and statutory provisions, the Federal Circuit and Sixth Circuit came to 
irreconcilable conclusions as to the proper interpretation of the revenue 
rulings. 
 
 
 174. I.R.C. § 3402(o) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 612. 
 175. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 612–13. The court summarized its findings accordingly: 
When § 3402(o) was enacted in 1969, Congress recognized that SUB payments ―are not 
subject to [federal income tax] withholding because they do not constitute wages or 
remuneration for services.‖ Because SUB payments ―are generally taxable income to the 
recipient,‖ however, Congress decided to require federal income tax withholding on SUB 
payments to alleviate any unexpected income tax burden on employees for the calendar year 
in which the payments were made. Congress stressed ―that although these benefits are not 
wages, since they are generally taxable payments they should be subject to withholding to 
avoid the final tax payment problem for employees.‖ As a result of the enactment of § 
3402(o), the ―withholding requirements . . . on wages are to apply to these non-wage 
payments.‖  
Id. (emphasis added by the court) (citations omitted). 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 136–39. 
 177. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 613. The court summarized: ―Because Congress has provided 
that SUB payments are not ‗wages‘ and are treated only as if they were ‗wages‘ for purposes of federal 
income tax withholding, such payments are not ‗wages‘ for purposes of FICA taxation.‖ Id. at 616. 
 178. See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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C. What Does the IRS Have To Say About All of This? The “Reverse-
Course” Revenue Rulings 
The Internal Revenue Service‘s revenue rulings offer guidance on the 
agency‘s interpretation of particular issues within the tax code. Regarding 
the inclusion of certain non-wage payments as within the reach of FICA 
tax, however, the IRS ―has itself charted a path of ‗reverse-course‘ rulings 
on this issue since the 1950s [which] only adds to the difficulties faced by 
the courts in attempting to reach a reasoned resolution by explaining and 
accounting for this repeated change in agency position.‖180  
Starting in 1956 with Rev. Rul. 56-249, the IRS stated its position that 
a particular form of severance payments was not ―wages.‖181 The 
payments at issue were paid to individuals from a ―trust created pursuant 
to [a company‘s] supplemental unemployment benefit plan.‖182 In its 
ruling, the IRS cited the specific factors that prevented this particular type 
of payment from being classified as wages, including a contingency 
involving the eligibility requirements for state unemployment benefit 
programs.
183
  
In three subsequent rulings, Rev. Rul. 58-128, Rev. Rul. 59-227, Rev. 
Rul. 60-330, the IRS broadened its classification of the types of payments 
that are non-wages.
184
 First, Rev. Rul. 58-128 held that a supplemental 
 
 
 180. In re Quality Stores, Inc., 424 B.R. 237, 240 (W.D. Mich. 2010). 
 181. Rev. Rul. 56–249, 1956–1 C.B. 488. 
 182. Id. at 489. 
 183. Id. at 492. The Ruling enumerated the determinative characteristics of these payments as 
follows: 
(1) the benefits are paid only to unemployed former employees of M Company who are on 
layoff from the Company; (2) eligibility for benefits depends on the meeting of prescribed 
conditions subsequent to the termination of the employment relationship with M Company; 
(3) benefits are paid by the trustees of independent trust funds; (4) the amount of a weekly 
benefit payable under the plan is based upon (a) the amount of the weekly benefit payable 
under the appropriate State unemployment compensation laws, (b) the amount of other 
remuneration allowable under such State unemployment compensation laws, and (c) the 
amount of straight-time weekly pay after withholding of all taxes and contributions; (5) the 
duration of weekly benefits payable under the plan depends upon a combination of (a) the 
number of accumulated credited units, and (b) the fund position; (6) a right, if any, to benefits 
does not accrue until a prescribed period after the termination of the employment relationship 
with M Company has elapsed; (7) the benefits ultimately paid are not attributable to the 
rendering of particular services by the recipient during the period of his employment; and 
(8) no employee has any right, title, or interest in or to any of the assets of the fund or in or to 
any Company contributions thereto until such time as he is qualified and eligible to receive a 
benefit therefrom. 
Id. 
 184. See CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (briefly discussing 
these rulings).  
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unemployment benefit plan that was initiated by the employer unilaterally, 
rather than as part of a collective bargaining agreement, was not within the 
definition of wages for FICA purposes.
185
 Second, Rev. Rul. 59-227 
extended this non-wage treatment to payments made as one lump sum, 
rather than over an extended period of time.
186
 Finally, in Rev. Rul. 60-
330, the IRS concluded that payments made directly by an employer, 
rather than through a trust as part of a supplemental unemployment benefit 
plan, would not be subject to FICA taxation.
187
 
In 1960, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 501(c), which explicitly provided 
tax exemption for trusts that were used to pay supplemental 
unemployment compensation benefits.
188
 It also supplied its own 
definition of supplemental unemployment compensation benefits.
189
 
Accordingly, the basis for a changing course emerged, and in Rev. Rul. 
71-408, the IRS determined that certain ―dismissal payments made to 
former employees by a company which had terminated its operations‖ 
were taxable wages under FICA.
190
 In this ruling, the IRS cited the 
regulations implementing FICA and the income tax provisions. 
Particularly, the IRS noted: 
 Sections 31.3121(a)-1(i), 31.3306(b)-1(i), and 31.3401(a)-
1(a)(5) of the Employment Tax Regulations provide that 
remuneration for employment, unless specifically excepted, 
constitutes ‗wages‘ even though at the time paid the individual is no 
longer an employee. 
 
 
 185. Rev. Rul. 58–128, 1958–1 C.B. 89, 89–90. The payments at issue in Rev. Rul. 56-249 were 
created as part of a collective bargaining agreement. See 1958-1 C.B. at 489. So, Rev. Rul. 58-128 
directly broadened the ―non-wage‖ classification. 
 186. See Rev. Rul. 59-227, 1959-2 C.B. 13, 14. Payments made under a trust, as in Rev. Rul. 56-
249, were paid on a continuing basis. See 156-1 C.B. at 489–90. Again, this ruling represented a direct 
extension of the non-wage classification. 
 187. See Rev. Rul. 60–330, 1960–2 C.B. 46, 47–48. To summarize, these three rulings extended 
the non-wage designation to payments that were paid under a trust or directly by an employer, were 
created under a collective bargaining agreement or by the employer unilaterally, and to payments that 
were paid on a continuing basis or as one lump sum. In other words, these rulings encompassed most 
types of post-employment benefit plans offered by employers. 
 188. Pub. L. No. 86–667, 74 Stat. 534 (1960).  
 189. I.R.C. § 501(c)(17)(D) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) provides:  
The term ―supplemental unemployment compensation benefits‖ means only— 
(i) benefits which are paid to an employee because of his involuntary separation from the 
employment of the employer (whether or not such separation is temporary) resulting directly 
from a reduction in force, the discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other similar 
conditions, and 
(ii) sick and accident benefits subordinate to the benefits described in clause (i). 
 190. Rev. Rul. 71–408, 1971–2 C.B. 340, 340. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2013] FICA TAXATION OF POST-EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 233 
 
 
 
 
 Section 31.3401(a)-1(b)(4) of the regulations specifically 
provides, for purposes of income tax withholding, that all payments 
made by an employer to an employee on account of dismissal, that 
is, involuntary separation from the service of the employer, 
constitute ‗wages' regardless of whether the employer is legally 
bound by contract, statute, or otherwise to make the payments.
191
 
The IRS acknowledged the presence of the familiar issue as to whether 
the income tax provision can be extended to FICA.
192
 To bridge this issue, 
the IRS looked to the history of FICA and noted that, prior to 1950, the 
term ―wages‖ explicitly excluded ―dismissal payments which the 
employer was not legally required to make.‖193 In 1950, however, 
Congress passed the Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, which 
deleted this exclusion.
194
 The Revenue Ruling then quoted a passage from 
a House Report on these 1950 amendments providing: ―a dismissal 
payment, which is any payment made by an employer on account of 
involuntary separation of the employee from the service of the employer, 
will constitute wages.‖195 It is important to note here that Rev. Rul. 71-408 
framed the issue as involving ―dismissal payments,‖ as defined in the 
House Report and the Treasury Regulations above, rather the statutorily 
defined ―supplemental unemployment benefits.‖196 A similar approach 
was taken in Rev. Rul. 74-252, where the IRS concluded that a 
contractually agreed-upon ―dismissal payment‖ for early termination by 
the employer was a form of ―wages‖ subject to FICA.197  
In 1977, the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 77-347 to address the enactment of 
I.R.C. § 3402(o), the statutory provision extending income tax withholding 
to certain payments other than wages, including SUB payments.
198
 In that 
 
 
 191. Id. at 341. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. 
 194. Pub. L. No. 81-734 64 Stat. 477, 546 (1950). 
 195. Rev. Rul. 71-408, 1971-2 C.B. at 341 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 81-1300 (1950)). 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 189, 191, and 195; see also CSX Corp. v. United States, 
518 F.3d 1328, 1337 (Fed Cir. 2008). 
 197. Rev. Rul. 74–252, 1974–1 C.B. 287, 288; see also In re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d 605, 
618 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 198. Rev. Rul. 77–347, 1977–2 C.B. 363. The Federal Circuit provided a useful summary of the 
circumstances leading to the enactment of § 3402(o): 
 During the 1960s, SUB payments were treated, for income tax purposes, as ordinary 
income to the recipient, but not as wages for purposes of either the income tax withholding 
statutes or FICA. It soon became evident, however, that treating SUB payments in that 
manner was creating a problem. Because SUB payments were not treated as wages, income 
tax was not withheld from SUB payments that were made to employees. Yet because SUB 
payments were included in gross income, the failure to withhold from those payments meant 
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ruling, the IRS concluded that payments made from a trust fund 
established pursuant to a supplemental unemployment compensation plan 
are not ―wages‖ for the purposes of FICA, even though they were not tied 
to a state unemployment benefit program.
199
 Here the IRS clarified that the 
payments considered in Rev. Rul. 56-249 are within the statutory 
definition of ―supplemental unemployment benefits‖ under § 3402(o) and 
that while this type of payment is subject to income tax withholding, it is 
not a form of wages for FICA.
200
 This focus on SUB payments is in 
contrast to the non-statutory ―dismissal payments‖ discussed in Rev. Ruls. 
71-408 and 74-252.
201
 
Finally, in Rev. Rul. 90-72, the IRS announced: ―the definition of SUB 
pay under section 3402(o) is not applicable to FICA or FUTA. For FICA 
and FUTA purposes, SUB pay is defined solely through a series of 
administrative pronouncements published by the Service.‖202 In this ruling, 
the IRS concluded that to be exempt from ―wages‖ under FICA, SUB 
payments ―must be linked to the receipt of state unemployment 
compensation and must not be received in a lump sum.‖203 This ruling 
contended that it ―restore[d] the distinction between SUB pay and 
dismissal pay by re-establishing the link between SUB pay and state 
unemployment compensation set forth in Rev. Rul. 56-249.‖204 Further, 
―benefits provided in the form of a lump sum are not considered linked to 
state unemployment compensation for this purpose, and are therefore not 
excludable from wages as SUB pay.‖205 The effect of Rev. Rul. 90-72, in 
short, was to clarify that only a specific type of payments are ―SUB 
payments,‖ which would not be subject to FICA withholding, while 
providing that ―dismissal payments,‖ broadly defined, are wages for FICA 
purposes. This ruling also provided that the definition of SUB payments, 
for FICA purposes, came from administrative pronouncements, rather than 
from § 3402(o). 
 
 
that employees who received those payments were encountering large tax obligations 
attributable to the SUB payments at the end of the taxable year. 
CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1336. To address this problem, I.R.C. § 3402(o) was added as part of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, to extend federal income tax withholding to SUB payments, 
even though they were not ―wages.‖ CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1336.  
 199. Rev. Rul. 77–347, 1977–2 C.B. at 363. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text. 
 202. Rev. Rul. 90-72, 1990-2 C.B. 211, 211–12 (quoted in CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1339) 
(emphasis added). 
 203. Id. at 211. 
 204. Id. at 212. 
 205. Id. 
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The revenue rulings from 1956 to 1990 do not provide definitive 
guidance, although Rev. Rul. 90-72 appears to delineate the IRS‘s position 
as finding most of the severance payments at issue in this Note to be 
within the scope of ―wages‖ by defining them as ―dismissal payments.‖ 
While the Federal Circuit and Sixth Circuit each provided a detailed 
analysis of these rulings, the courts have reached different conclusions. 
1. Federal Circuit Analysis of the Revenue Rulings 
The Federal Circuit in CSX Corp. took a detailed approach to analyzing 
the Revenue Rulings dating back to 1956. It considered CSX‘s reliance on 
Rev. Rul. 77-347, the first Ruling after the addition of I.R.C. § 3402(o), 
which held that benefits paid from a trust fund are not wages, even if the 
plan is not tied to a state unemployment benefit plan. The court ultimately 
rejected this reliance as improper, instead considering the particular factual 
circumstances at issue in the 1977 Ruling.
206
 Taking a holistic approach 
and considering all of the rulings as harmonious, the court rejected CSX‘s 
analogy to Rev. Rul. 77-347.
207
 The court summarized its conclusion 
accordingly: 
If the 1977 revenue ruling stood for the proposition that all 
payments fitting the definition of SUB under section 3402(o) are 
deemed non-wages for purposes of FICA, as CSX contends, the 
1965, 1971, and 1974 revenue rulings would appear to have been 
silently overruled. Rather than interpret the 1977 revenue ruling to 
have such a dramatic (but unannounced or unrecognized) effect, we 
think the 1977 revenue ruling is better interpreted to have the more 
modest effect of announcing that payments under a plan satisfying 
the definition of SUB in section 3402(o)(2)(A) are subject to 
income tax withholding, and payments under a plan having similar 
characteristics to the one in Rev. Rul. 56–249 are not subject to 
taxation under FICA.
208
 
The Federal Circuit took care to discuss what it considered an 
important distinction between ―dismissal payments,‖ as discussed in 
earlier revenue rulings, and ―supplemental unemployment benefits‖ as 
defined in § 3402(o).
209
 Under the Treasury Regulations, ―not all dismissal 
 
 
 206. See CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1337–38. 
 207. Id. at 1338.  
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. at 1338–41. 
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payments would constitute SUB payments, but all SUB payments would 
qualify as dismissal payments.‖210 The court noted that this distinction is 
not problematic within the confines of the income tax provisions in 
Chapter 24 of the tax code, as both types of payments are subject to 
withholding.
211
 But, the court contended, if the § 3402(o) definition of 
SUB payments is construed to apply to other provisions of the tax code, 
such as FICA, and it is interpreted to exclude SUB payments from 
―wages,‖ this would create a conflict with other courts‘ treatment of 
dismissal payments as wages under FICA.
212
 Because the court had 
already rejected the statutory argument that § 3402(o) applies to FICA,
213
 
it classified the payments at issue as dismissal payments, and thus subject 
to FICA withholding.
214
 
2. Sixth Circuit Analysis of the Revenue Rulings 
As if to foreshadow the present split among circuit courts of appeal, the 
bankruptcy court in Quality Stores asserted that ―[r]evenue rulings do not 
have the binding force of statutory provisions or the presumption of 
correctness of the regulations,‖ thereby establishing that it would not give 
ultimate weight to a particular ruling.
215
 In sharp contrast to the Federal 
Circuit‘s approach, the Sixth Circuit relied on Rev. Rul. 77-347 to support 
its conclusion.
216
 The Sixth Circuit characterized its differing approach 
from CSX as follows: 
 
 
 210. Id. at 1340. The court cited Treasury Regulation § 31.3401(a)–1(b)(4), which defines 
dismissal payments as ―[a]ny payments made by an employer to an employee on account of dismissal, 
that is, involuntary separation from the service of the employer,‖ and Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)–
1(b)(14)(ii), which defines supplemental unemployment compensation benefits as  
―amounts which are paid to an employee pursuant to a plan to which the employer is a party, 
because of the employee's involuntary separation from the employment of the employer, whether 
or not such separation is temporary, but only when such separation is one resulting directly from a 
reduction in force, the discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other similar conditions.‖  
Id. 
 211. Id. at 1340–41. 
 212. Id. at 1341 (citing Abrahamsen v. United States, 228 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); Greenwald 
v. United States, 2000 WL 16939 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.10, 2000); McCorkill v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 2d 
46 (D. Conn. 1999); Meehan v. Comm‘r, 122 T.C. 396 (2004)). 
 213.  See supra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of the Federal Circuit‘s statutory analysis. 
 214. CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1352. In concluding that dismissal payments are within the scope of 
FICA ―wages,‖ the Federal Circuit relied on the 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act, which 
deleted an explicit exclusion of ―dismissal payments‖ from the definition of ―wages.‖ See supra text 
accompanying notes 193–95; see also CSX Corp. 518 F.3d at 1345–46. 
 215. In re Quality Stores, Inc., 383 B.R. 67, 75 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008).  
 216. See In re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d 605, 619 (6th Cir. 2012) (―Thus, Rev. Rul. 77–347 is 
consistent with both our conclusion and that of the bankruptcy court that because SUB payments are 
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 In CSX Corp., the Federal Circuit adopted the IRS's eight-part 
administrative definition of SUB pay set out in Rev. Rul. No. 56–
249 and Rev. Rul. 90–72 rather than the express statutory definition 
provided by Congress in § 3402(o). That court characterized the 
payments before it as ―dismissal pay‖ subject to FICA tax.217 
 By contrast, we resolve the tension between the statutory 
enactments and the IRS revenue rulings in favor of the expressed 
will of the legislature. Applying the five-part definition that 
Congress enacted in § 3402(o)(2)(A), the payments made by 
Quality Stores to its former employees qualify as SUB payments, 
not ―dismissal pay.‖ And as we have explained, SUB payments are 
not subject to FICA tax.
218
 
Like the issue of statutory interpretation, the courts‘ approaches to the 
Revenue Rulings from 1956 to 1990 represent another fundamental 
departure in the courts‘ analyses, offering further evidence of the need for 
a definite resolution.
219
  
D. Bridging the Circuit Split: A Summary 
The Sixth Circuit in Quality Stores concluded: ―We agree with the 
Federal Circuit on one final important point: ‗We acknowledge that this 
issue of statutory construction is complex and that the correct resolution of 
the issue is far from obvious.‘‖220 Neither the FICA statute nor the 
Treasury Regulations explicitly address SUB payments.
221
 Instead, the 
courts looked to the provisions of the tax code that cover federal income 
tax withholding and used the definitions therein, particularly I.R.C. 
 
 
not ‗wages‘ and are only treated as if they were ‗wages‘ under § 3402(o), SUB payments also are not 
‗wages‘ under FICA.‖). 
 217. Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 619 (internal citations omitted). By way of reminder, the court in 
CSX Corp. concluded that § 3402(o) did not apply to FICA, see supra text accompanying note 164. 
 218. Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 619. The Sixth Circuit also contended that the Revenue Rulings 
conflicted with congressional intent. Id. at 616–17. The trial court in CSX Corp. had previously 
declined to consider the multi-part definition laid out in Rev. Rul. 56-249. See CSX Corp. v. United 
States, 52 Fed. Cl. 208, 217 (2002) (noting that the definition laid out in Rev. Rul. 56-249 was ―not 
incorporated into I.R.C. § 3402(o)‖ by Congress, despite the fact that Congress presumably knew of 
the ruling at the time it enacted § 3402(o)). 
 219. See infra Part V. 
 220. Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 620 (citing CSX Corp. v. United States 518 F.3d 1328, 1340 (Fed 
Cir. 2008)). 
 221. See id. at 611 (―Whether SUB payments are ‗wages‘ under FICA is a complex question 
because the FICA statute does not expressly include or exclude SUB payments, nor do the Treasury 
regulations promulgated under FICA address the subject.‖). 
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§ 3402(o).
222
 Section 3402(o) defines ―supplemental unemployment 
benefits‖ and provides that they should be treated ―as if‖ they are a 
payment of wages for purposes of the federal income tax provisions.
223
 
The courts take differing views of this provision and whether it requires a 
reading that the SUB payments are wages, and then, whether this income 
tax provision can be applied to FICA provisions. Contributing to this 
complexity is the lack of clear, discernible guidance on point, as 
demonstrated by the changing position of the IRS in its revenue rulings. 
The fact that each court conducted a painstakingly detailed analysis, only 
to reach opposite conclusions, shows that there is no simple legal answer. 
Further, the sociopolitical post-recession climate shows that there is no 
simple policy answer either. 
V. A GREAT CASE AND A HARD CASE, BUT BAD LAW? 
Issues of the type in this Note—those with broad importance, diverse 
stakeholders, and puzzling legal authority—give rise to the potential for 
seemingly arbitrary, ends-dictated judicial decisionmaking simply because 
the ambiguity in the legal authority makes it amenable to both sides of an 
argument. If ever there was such a thing, this form of decisionmaking is a 
likely precursor to ―bad law.‖  
The Supreme Court will consider In re Quality Stores on appeal in the 
near future,
224
 which may provide the binding authority needed to generate 
uniformity and thereby mitigate the ―bad law‖ potential in lower-court 
decisions. In theory, a Supreme Court decision will serve the singular goal 
of interpreting the statute—―find[ing] the meaning of some not very 
difficult words.‖225 In its decision, then, the Court should provide an 
 
 
 222. See id. (―We observe that, for purposes of federal income tax withholding, I.R.C. § 3402, 
Congress adopted a definition of ‗wages‘ that is nearly identical to the definition of ‗wages‘ included 
in FICA.‖); CSX Corp., 518 F.3d at 1331 (noting ―the general rule that the term ‗wages‘ has the same 
meaning for FICA as for the income tax laws‖); see also Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 
(1981). 
 223. I.R.C. § 3402(o)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 224. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 605, cert. granted, 81 USLW 3680, 2013 WL 2370291 
(2013). 
 225. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also 
supra note 2 and accompanying text. In Northern Securities Co., the Court held that the Sherman Act 
applied to a securities company. See id. at 360 (majority opinion). Justice Holmes‘s dissent could aptly 
apply to the issue in this Note: 
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of 
their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of 
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. 
These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously 
was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend. 
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answer to the statutory puzzle. Of course, given the soundness in both the 
Sixth Circuit‘s and the Federal Circuit‘s opinions, conducting a purely 
legal analysis resulting in any clear conclusion is, quite apparently, no 
simple task.  
That said, reconsideration of one piece in the statutory puzzle could 
provide a helpful basis for moving toward a decision. Both the Sixth 
Circuit and the Federal Circuit considered Rowan Companies, Inc. v. 
United States
226
 for its proposition that ―wages‖ has the same definition 
under FICA as it does under the income tax provision.
227
 The 1983 
―decoupling amendment‖ provided that an income tax regulation creating 
certain exclusions from ―wages‖ should not be construed to require a 
similar exclusion from ―wages‖ in FICA regulations.228 It remains 
ineffective, however, in the absence of an applicable Treasury regulation. 
The amendment simply ―gives the IRS the ability to establish distinctions 
between the two statutory definitions‖ of wages, a power which has not 
yet been exercised.
229
  
While the Sixth Circuit and Federal Circuit were bound by Rowan, the 
Supreme Court is not. Even without expressly overruling Rowan, the 
Court may take the ―decoupling amendment‖ as persuasive and decline to 
apply Rowan to this analysis. Removing Rowan from the picture 
undermines the analytical basis for applying the income tax provision to 
FICA. Thus, the analysis would focus only on whether the particular 
severance payments at issue fall within the FICA definition of wages, with 
 
 
What we have to do in this case is to find the meaning of some not very difficult words. We 
must try,—I have tried,—to do it with the same freedom of natural and spontaneous 
interpretation that one would be sure of if the same question arose upon an indictment for a 
similar act which excited no public attention, and was of importance only to a prisoner before 
the court. Furthermore, while at times judges need for their work the training of economists or 
statesmen, and must act in view of their foresight of consequences, yet, when their task is to 
interpret and apply the words of a statute, their function is merely academic to begin with,—
to read English intelligently,—and a consideration of consequences comes into play, if at all, 
only when the meaning of the words used is open to reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 400–01 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
226. 452 U.S. 247 (1981). 
227. See Rowan, 452 U.S. at 263; supra Part IV.A.  
228.  I.R.C. § 3121(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
 229.  In re Quality Stores, Inc., 383 B.R. 67, 78 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008) (emphasis added). The 
court characterized the argument as: ―According to the IRS, these amendments contain a ‗decoupling‘ 
provision that specifically rejects Rowan‘s conclusion that wages should be defined the same for 
purposes of income tax withholding and FICA taxation.‖ Id. at 73; see also Canisius Coll. v. United 
States, 799 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1986) (―Congress in 1983 overturned the general premise of Rowan by 
enacting provisions that ‗decoupled‘ the interpretations of FICA and FUTA wages from the 
interpretation of wages for income-tax purposes.‖). 
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no consideration of the income tax provision.
230
 Such an approach would 
more truly be characterized as simply ―find[ing] the meaning of some not 
very difficult words.‖231 
Despite the difficultly in answering this question from a strictly legal 
perspective with no reference to policy matters, a comprehensive answer 
that addresses both the statutory puzzle and the sociopolitical conundrum 
would best come from Congress or perhaps an applicable Treasury 
regulation. 
Purportedly, Congress would stand in the best position to bring to bear 
the various policy matters in a comprehensive analysis as it rewrites the 
law.
232
 Medicare and Social Security require attention,
233
 at which time 
Congress could also clarify the exact scope of FICA. Of course, an issue 
involving any one of Social Security, Medicare, a payroll tax, and 
unemployment is akin to a political minefield. In this sense, it is not 
difficult to understand why politicians may prefer not to take a position on 
an issue that combines all of those thorny components and leads to a 
discernible loss to at least one major stakeholder.
234
 Even if one entirely 
sets aside partisan politics and re-election motives, there is no 
straightforward answer. However ideal it may be in the abstract, the 
possibility of a congressional response is remote under even the best of 
circumstances.
235
 
A more plausible middle ground, one allowing for broader policy 
consideration would come in the form of a Treasury regulation. As noted, 
promulgation of regulations that clarify whether FICA and the income tax 
provisions are to be given the same definition and treatment of ―wages‖ 
would allow courts to refine their analyses.
236
 Of course, this regulation 
would only guide future courts‘ analyses as to the applicability of Rowan, 
and it would not guarantee a uniform outcome, as the question would still 
remain a complicated issue of statutory interpretation.
237
  
 
 
230. See I.R.C. § 3121(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
231. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
232. See Quality Stores, 693 F.3d at 620 (―While the Supreme Court may ultimately provide us 
with the correct resolution of these difficult issues under the law as it currently stands, only Congress 
can clarify the statutes concerning the imposition of FICA tax on SUB payments. Our role is to 
interpret the statutory law as it presently exists, and we have done that today.‖). 
233. See supra note 48. 
234. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
235. It is likely that even a more cohesive Congress than the present one might struggle to come to 
a consensus on whether severance payments are ―wages‖ under FICA. As discussed, it is a politically 
thorny issue. That said, given the present state of our sharply divided Congress, it is unclear that this 
issue will receive such careful attention in the near future.  
236. See supra notes 135 and 143 and accompanying text. 
237. In the absence of Rowan as a piece to this puzzle (and depending on the exact Treasury 
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Any solution, be it legislative, regulatory, or judicial, is going to be 
imperfect because of a structural inability for any such response to 
consider all relevant components of the broader issue. However apparently 
simple in implementation, a single answer will have major consequences 
for at least one group of stakeholders and the potential for broad 
consequences for all involved parties. The upcoming Supreme Court 
decision is much needed to promote uniformity among the courts 
confronting this and similar issues, but ideally, at some point in the future, 
a thoughtful and comprehensive response will come from Congress.  
Amanda Stein  
 
 
regulation that would be promulgated), courts would be left to analyze the particular severance 
payments at issue, and then to determine whether they are ―wages‖ as that term is defined in I.R.C. 
§ 3121(a), with no consideration of the analogous income tax provisions. Varying approaches to 
statutory interpretation could still prevent unanimity on this issue, depending on how the Supreme 
Court decides this case. 
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